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Comments
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT-INsURANCE CONTRACTS
When the beneficiary or assured of an insurance contract brings an action for
the total single benefit there promised, it is not difficult to ascertain "the sum or
value" of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction;1 but when
only recovery of limited installments of a continuing benefit is sought-or when
the insurer seeks to cancel his as yet unmatured contract-the problem becomes
more baffling and the authorities less conclusive.
The guiding precedent for the "installment actions" was not an insurance case
at all. In Elgin v. MarshallZ2 suit was brought to recover $1,660.75 allegedly due
on coupons detached from municipal bonds issued by defendant. Although decision
of the case would also conclude the disputed liability on the much larger principal
sum, not yet due, on principles of res adjudicata, the Supreme Court declined juris-
diction, holding that the statutes limiting federal jurisdiction in "diversity" and
"federal question" cases to those where the matter in controversy exceeded the
sum or value of $20003 had reference to the matter directly in dispute and did
not permit the court to estimate its collateral effect in a subsequent suit. The Court
was frank in its admission that the easy application of the rule was a cardinal
reason for its adoption,4 but much can be said for the decision as a logical inter-
pretation of the controlling statute. The plaintiff makes the case, and "the matter
in controversy" is no more than his right to what he asks from the defendant.5
Any other result can be reached only by finding the statute to refer, by the words
"matter in controversy," to disputes outside the particular action over which the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, under the statute, is questioned.
Perhaps the leading case applying this doctrine to suits on insurance policies
is Wright v. Mutual Life nsurance Co. of New York,0 which was an action in a
state court to recover the accrued monthly payments allegedly due on an accident
policy. The amount of the payments due at the time of the suit amounted to only
420 but the substantial defense-that the insured's death was not accidental-
affected all future liabilities under the policy. An attempt to remove the case to
the federal court was unsuccessful, the circuit court of appeals observing: "It is
1. See (1940) 28 U. S. C. A. 41 (1).
2. 106 U. S. 578 (1882).
3. Now $3000, (1940) 28 U. S. C. A. 41 (1).
4. Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U. S. 578, 580 (1882).
5. The "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule in calculating the sum or value of die
matter in controversy is elaborated by Professor (now Judge) Dobie in Jurisdic-
tional Amount in the United States District Court, (1925) 38 HAav. L. REv. 733.
See also DOBIE on FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRocEDURa, § 56 (1928).
6. 19 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927), aff. per curiam sub nomine, Mutual
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well settled in this court that, when our jurisdiction depends upon the amount in
controversy, it is determined by the amount involved in the particular case, and
not by any contingent loss either one of the parties may sustain by the probative
effect of the judgment however certain it may be that such loss will occur."7
Although there has been an understandable and recurrent sentiment to consider
the actual difference to the plaintiff (in terms of his probable future benefits accord-
ing to his life expectancy under the accepted mortality tables) or to the defendant
(in terms of the reserves which the insurer must maintain to meet his liability under
the policy) which the decision of the case will make, the distinct weight of authority
follows the Wright case." A recent decision in accord is Mutual Life Insurance Co.
of New York v. MayleY Contra authority, such as Enzar v. Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance Co.,10 frequently relies on decisions rendered in suits of a different char-
acter-suits to cancel the policy are typical-where the entire policy is directly
involved.
Under the common statutes-or policy provisions-making the insurance poli-
cies incontestable for any reason other than nonpayment of premiums after the
expiration of a comparatively short time, in many cases the insurer can protect
himself from fraud or misrepresentation only by a suit to cancel the policy. It is
here that the "sum or value of the matter in controversy" is the mosit difficult to
ascertain and the law the most uncertain. Jurisdiction has been most frequently
tested by the face value of the policies sought to be cancelled, on the theory that
the right to be relieved from such liability was the matter in controversy.11 Un-
7. The court was here quoting from New England Mortgage Co. v. Gay,
145 U. S. 123, 130 (1892).
8. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Wilson, 81 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936); Small v. New York Life Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 820 (N. D. Ala., 1937);
Berlin v. Travellers Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 126 (D. C. Md., 1937); Edelman v.
Travellers Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 209 (D. C. Md., 1937); Shabotzky v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 167 (S. D. N. Y., 1937); Stockman v. Reliance Life Ins.
Co., 28 F. Supp. 446 (W. D. S. C., 1939); cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297
U. S. 672 (1936).
9. 116 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). This was an action for declaratoryjudgment, but the only factual issue was of "total and permanent" disability, and
the judgment fixed only the liability for the benefits claimed due at the time of
suit.
10. 14 F. Supp. 677 (E. D. S. C., 1936). In that case there was a prayer for
"specific performance" in the future as well as for. payment of past due install-
ments. To decree specific performance in such a case, in absence of more positive
evidence that it was necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits, would seem to
extend jurisdiction beyond previously recognized limits. Trainor v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 131 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 7th,. 1942). Quaere, does such a prayer change
the character of the suit sufficiently to justify a different test of jurisdictional
amount. The court was admittedly not uninfluenced by it, and, it is submitted,
rightly so, if there appeared from the face of the bill any legal possibility of ob-
taining the relief sought. Trainor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra.
11. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Swift, 38 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930);
Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 71 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Mass.
Protective Ass'n., Inc. v. Kitties, 2 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). In Jensen
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), jurisdiction was
sustained but the court adopted no single test. Referring to the "face value" test,
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fortunately, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. That the matter in
controversy is the insurer's right to be relieved from the obligations of the con-
tract for the reasons alleged is true, but it is seldom that the right is worth the
face amount of the policy to him, for by the very terms of the contract he will
become liable for that amount only in case future premiums are paid to him. The
true value of the right to cancel is the difference between the face amount of the
policy less the present value of the premiums to be expected from one in the in-
sured's circumstances under the mortality tables.
To put the case concretely, let us assume that a man of twenty-seven receives
a $5000 policy by virtue of an application falsely stating he had never suffered any
pulmonary disease. The annual premium is $125. If he had truthfully stated that
he had been treated for pulmonary tuberculosis but had had no symptoms for five
years, the company would have "rated up" his policy fifteen years, and the annual
premium would have been $150. One year later the insurer sues to cancel the
policy for fraudulent misrepresentation. By its own estimate, it may expect to re-
ceive under the policy the inadequate premium of $125 for as many years as con-
stitute the life expectancy of a man of forty-two (in a cancellation suit, the insurer
must tender back the premiums received, so the case must be viewed as of the
date of contracting). The difference to the plaintiff of winning or losing his suit
is the difference between $150 and $125, multiplied by the actual life expectancy
of the defendant and discounted to the date of the policy.
Use of the mortality tables to test jurisdictional amount has received judicial
sanction in analokous cases. Thompson v. Thompson12 was a suit by a wife for
maintenance of herself and her child, which had been fixed at $75 a month. Hold-
ing that the future payments were not in any way contingent or speculative, though
subject to change, the court looked at the life expectancies of the parties to sustain
federal jurisdiction. (As the case was on appeal from the original decree first
determining the right to, and fixing the amount of, the maintenance, the decision
should not be confused with the installment cases exemplified by Town of Elgin
v. Marshall and Wright v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.)
Broth-erhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Pinkston3 was a suit
for accounting, determination of priorities and proper liquidation of a pension
fund which defendant had decided to abolish and from which plaintiff was entitled
to a $135 monthly pension for life. Determination of plaintiff's entire interest was
essential to final adjudication of the suit. Actuarial determination of the extent
of plaintiff's interest was necessary for this purpose, and was resorted to in order
to sustain jurisdiction.
the "maximum possible loss" test, and the "ultimate pecuniary loss" test, jurisdic-
tion was said to be satisfied by any of the three.
12. 226 U. S. 551 (1912).
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No case has been found squarely adopting the test suggested above in can-
cellation suits.' 4 In many cases the life expectancy of the insured, who, for the
very reasons that cancellation is sought, may not be subject to any available mor-
tality table (in other words, is uninsurable at any premium), cannot be found
with sufficient precision to justify its use. This fact, however, does not make any
more accurate the "face value" test, nor the "cash reserve" test sometimes em-
ployed'5 on the theory that the suit is one to relieve the company of the necessity
of maintaifiing a reserve against the policy. Cancellation of the policy does not
necessarily mean a saving to the company of the amount of the reserve, nor that
it would otherwise be lost if the policy stayed in force. Again, the only loss to
the company, through its effect on the reserve, is the actuarial inadequacy of the
policy sought to be cancelled.
The courts have been extremely liberal about sustaining jurisdiction in these
cases. The general rule requires a plaintiff'to allege, and if challenged, to prove
the facts giving federal jurisdiction. Difficulty of precise valuation won't prevent
jurisdiction but hopeless uncertainty will. But in suits to cancel life insurance
policies not only have the courts tested jurisdiction by theories patently too favor-
able to the plaintiff but at least one court, recognizing the pertinency of a life
expectancy valuation, observed that if the object sought has a value which could
exceed $3000, the allegation of jurisdictional amount could not be refuted.20
0. B. E.
14. The point was recognized in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27
F. (2d) 753 (W. D. Va., 1928) but no actual estimate of the value was made
and jurisdiction was sustained on the theory that the maximum possible loss ex-
ceeded $3000. Accord, Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n. v. Fortenberry,
98 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), where the policy provided for waiyer of
premium payments during disability.
15. Jensen v. New York Life Ins. Soc., 50 F. (2d)'512 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 38 F. (2d) 524 (D. C. Neb., 1929); Tharkelson v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 570 (D. C. Minn., 1934); Mutual Benefit Health
and Accident Ass'n. v. Fortenberry, 98 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Joseph, 5 F. Supp. 1003 (D. C. Minn., 1934).
16. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27 F. (2d) 753 (D. C. Va., 1928).
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